UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-17-2018

Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC Respondent's
Brief Dckt. 45517

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Monitor Finance, L.C. v. Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45517" (2018). Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 7255.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7255

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Defendant/Appellant,
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;-and PIONEER
TITLE COMP ANY OF BANNOCK COUNTY,
INC.,

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 45517-2017

BANNOCK COUNTY
CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

Defendants.

WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Counter-claimant/Appellant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County
Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge presiding.
A. Bruce Larson and Richard A. Heam
Residing at 155 S. 2nd Ave., Pocatello, Idaho 83204, for Appellant
Ron Kerl
Residing at 151 N. 3rd Ave., Second Floor, Pocatello, Idaho 83205, for Respondents

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company, Defendant/Appellant;
M&S DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

SUPREME COURT
CASE NO. 45517-2017

Defendants.
BANNOCK COUNTY
WILDLIFE RIDGE ESTATES, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,

CASE NO. CV-2016-3588-0C

Counter-claimant/Appellant,
vs.
MONITOR FINANCE, L.C. , a Utah limited
liability company; and FIRST CAPITAL
FUNDING, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Counter-defendants/Respondents.
RESPONDENTS ' BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial Distiict for Bannock County
Honorable Robert C. Naftz, District Judge presiding.
A. Bruce Larson and Richard A. Heam
Residing at 155 S. 2°d Ave., Pocatello, Idaho 83204, for Appellant
Ron Kerl
Residing at 151 N. 3rd Ave., Second Floor, Pocatello, Idaho 83205, for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................ ............ ............................................... 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................... ......................... ............ ...... ................................... 1
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .............. ..................................................... 5
ARGUMENT ........................................................................... ....... .................. ............ .................. 6
A. Standard of Review ............ ........ .......................................... ...... .. ......... ................................ 6
B. The Dismissal of the First Action, With Prejudice, Required the Dismissal of Wildlife
Ridge's Affinnative Defenses and Counterclaim for Fraud in this Action Under the Doctrine
of Res Judicata ... .......................................................... ................. .............................................. 6
1. Millward and M & S Development Were Not Indispensable Pruiies to the First Action
and Their Absence as Parties Did Not Prevent Wildlife Ridge from Asserting Alternative
Claims for Relief in the First Action ......................................... .............................................. 9

2. Wildlife Ridge Could Have Asserted the Statute of Limitations and Other Grounds for
Relief in the Pirst Action ....................................................................................................... 12
3. The Administrative Dissolution of Monitor on November 9, 2012, Did Not Prevent it
From Being Sued in the First Action or From Filing the Present Action............................. 15
C. Respondents' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust Is Not Barred by the
Doctrine of Res Judicata ................................ .................................................................... ....... 17
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL ........................................................................................ ........ 20
CONCLUSION ..... .................................................................................................. ............... ....... 21
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................. ...................... .. ......... .......................................... 22

Respondents' Brief
Page - i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases
Babb v. Mid-Am. Auto Exch., Inc., 2006 WL 2714273 at *2 (D. Kan. Sept 22, 2006) ................ 11
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73,278 P.3d 943 (2012) ................. .................. 8
Elliot v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P .3d 803 (2002) ....................................... ...... 8
Galvanizer's Co. v. State Highway Commission, 8 Wn.App. 804,509 P2d. 73 (Wash. App. 1973)
......... ................................................................................................................................ .......... 19
Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 173 P.3d 1138 (2007) .......................................................... 14
Joyce v. Mwphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549,208 P. 241 (1922) ................................... 8
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993) ......... ........... 8, 12
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) .. ............. ......... 7, 8, 9
Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 157 P.3d 613, (2007) ............................................... 7, 9
Treasure Valley Plwnbing & Heating, Inc. v. Earth Resources Co., 115 Idaho 373, 766 P.2d
1254 (Ct.App.1988) ........................................................................................................... ....... 20
Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232,249 P.2d 814 (1952) ....................................................... .......... 12, 13
Statutes
11 U.S.C. 3727 .... ......................... ....................... .......... ........ ........................................................ 17
11 u.s.c. § 362 ............................................................................................................. 5, 10, 17, 18
Idaho Code§ 12-120 ......................................... ............................... ................. ........................ 5, 20
Idaho Code§ 12-1 21 ....................................................................................................................... 5
Idaho Code§ 45-1515 ............................................................................................................. 13, 15
Idaho Code§ 5-214A .............................................................................................................. 13, 14
Idaho Code§ 5-238 .... .............................................................................. . ....... 14
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 48-3a-703(2)(b)(iii) .......................................................................... 15
Other Authorities
Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Tab Decide Your Next Infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38
(2016) .......................................................................................................................................... 7
Rules
I.A.R. 41 ................................................. ............................................. ........... ...... ........................... 5
I.R.C.P. 56 ....................................................................................................................................... 6
I.R.C.P. 13(a) ............ ............................................................... ............... .. .................................... 19
I.R.C.P. 19(a) ........ .. .. ............. .. ... ... .. ...... ............ .............. ...... . ...... .. .. . .. 10, 11 , 19

Respondents' Brief
Page - ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This law suit was commenced on October 7, 2016, when Monitor Finance, L.C.
("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. ("First Capital")(collectively "Respondents") filed
their Complaint to Judicially Foreclose a Deed of Trust ("Complaint"). The Complaint sought to
enforce a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005, in the original p1incipal amount of
$244,000.00 ("Trust Deed Note"), as amended by a March 3, 2008 Modification,
("Modification"); and to judicially foreclose a Trust Deed, Assigmnent of Rents, Security
Agreement and Fixture Filing ("Deed of Trust") securing that obligation.
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge") filed its Answer and Counter-claim
seeking damages and a declaration from the trial court that the Trust Deed Note, Modification,
and the Deed of Trust were unenforceable and that the Respondents should be enjoined from
foreclosing the Deed of Trust ("Answer and Counterclaim"). R. Vol. I, pp. 51 - 69. Wildlife
Ridge's Affinnative Defenses included (1) Statute of Limitations - p. 53, ,llO, (2) Laches - p.
53, ,ll 1, (3) Collateral Estoppel - p.53, ,l12, (4) Res Judicata, claim and/or issue preclusion - p.
53, ,ll3, (5) Unclean Hands - p. 53, ,ll4, and (6) Fraud-p. 60.
This Appeal follows the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents.
The trial court concluded that Wildlife Ridge's affi1111ative defenses and counterclaim for fraud
were precluded bythedoctrineofresjudicata. R. Vol. Ipp. 135-149, 171-192.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Wildlife Ridge acquired the property described in the Deed of Trust on June 13, 2006, R.
Aug. pp. 46-48. At that time, Respondents had already been granted the beneficial interest in
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that land to secure the obligations described in the Deed of Trust, and legal title to that property
had been transferred to Pioneer Title Company as trustee of the Deed of Trust. R. Vol. I pp. 2750, 106-130.
The enforceability of the Deed of Trust, and the alleged satisfaction of the obligations
secured by that Deed of Trust were the subject of a prior lawsuit brought by Wildlife Ridge
against Respondents on December 3, 20 14. R. Aug. pp 1-21 (the "First Action"). In the First
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the property described in the
Deed of Trust, free and clear of the Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the Court that
the sums due and owing the Respondents and secured by the Deed of Trust had "been satisfied
by previously (sic) payments made to First Capital, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C." R. Aug.
pp. 4, ,r16.

Wildlife Ridge's Amended Complaint, filed in the First Action on March 12,

2015, sought that san1e relief. R. Aug. p. 9, ,r12.
On March 26, 2015, Respondents filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint and
denied Wildlife Ridge's right to any of the relief sought in its Amended Complaint. R. Aug. pp.
11 - 15.
On June 8, 2016, a Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice between Wildlife Ridge and
Respondents was filed in the First Action, and on June 14, 2016, the First Action was dismissed
by the court, with prejudice, with each paiiy bearing their own attorney fees and costs of suit (the
"Dismissal of the First Action"). R. Aug. pp. 16 - 21.
On January 6, 2017, the Respondents filed their motion for partial summary judgment in
the present case, seeking to strike all defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and
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Counter-claim under the applicable doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and claim
preclusion. R. Vol. I pp. 4, 136, 172. Respondents argued that the dismissal of the First Action
not only defeated the claims of Wildlife Ridge as alleged in the First Action, but also defeated
every other defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the Respondents' Trust Deed Note,
Modification, and Deed of Trust which might and should have been litigated in the First Action.
On March 27, 2017, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting
Respondents' motion for partial smmnary judgment. R. Vol. I pp. 135 - 149. The trial court
concluded that "the Defendant's affim1ative defenses and fraud claim are ba1Ted by the doctrine
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affomative defenses listed in Defendant's Answer, as well
as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed." R. Vol. Ip. 147.
On April 13, 2017, Respondents filed another motion for summary judgment seeking the
entry of a decree of foreclosure and the determination of the actual amount due and owing under
the Trust Deed Note and Modification (the "Second Summary Judgment Motion"). R. Vol. I pp.
6, 172. Wildlife Ridge opposed the Second Smmnary Judgment Motion by filing its Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court's March 27, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, but it did not
submit any opposing affidavits or additional evidence. R. Vol. Ip. 172.
On Jm1e 13, 2017, the trial comi issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting
Respondent's Second Summary Judgment Motion and denying Wildlife Ridge's motion for
reconsideration. R. Vol. I pp. 171 - 192.
On June 20, 2017, the trial court entered its Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order
of Sale autho1izing Respondents to proceed to foreclose the Deed of Trust at a sheriffs
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foreclosure sale. R. Vol. Ip 198 - 202. The sheriffs foreclosure sale was held on August 30,
2017, and Respondents became the purchasers of the two remaining lots encumbered by the

Deed of Trust. See, Exhibits "6", "7", and "8" to Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Appeal for Mootness dated April 4, 2018 (the "Mootness Affidavit").
Respondents also received payment of the net sale proceeds from the prior voluntary sale
of six (6) lots burdened by the Respondents' Deed of Trust. See, Mootness Affidavit, Exhibits

"1," "2," and "3."
When Wildlife Ridge acquired the prope1iy encumbered by the Deed of Trust on June 13,
2006, the Deed of Trust stated that it was:

"given for the purpose of securing the following obligations (collectively the
"Obligations" ofTrustor [M & S Development]:
2.1.1 Note. The payment and perfonnance of each and every agreement and
obligation under the Note [defined on page 1 of the Deed of Trust as the Trust
Deed Note] ....

***
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and perfonnance of any other note or
obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed. Trustor expressly
acknowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the security interest created
by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and future debts, obligations, and
liabilities of Trustor to Beneficiary without any limitation whatsoever."

R. Vol. I pp. 30 and 109.
The Modification expressly stated that the makers of the Trust Deed Note, Millward and
M & S Development, and the Respondents "acknowledge that the same tenns and conditions of

Respondents' Brief
Page - 4

the original Note and Trust Deed will apply to the amended amount and tenns." R. Vol. I pp. 26,
104.
Wildlife Ridge was aware of the Modification during the pendency of the First Action, as
a copy of the Modification was provided to Wildlife Ridge in the Respondents' August 12, 2015
response to Wildlife Ridge's First Set of Discovery. R. Aug pp. 53-54 and 56 - 173. See, R.
Aug. p. 169.

There is no evidence in the record that Wildlife Ridge was not aware of the

Modification during the pendency of the First Action.
The makers of the Trust Deed Note, Millward and M & S Development, and the Granter
of the Deed of Trust, M & S Development, were not named as Defendants in the First Action by
Wildlife Ridge.
1

The Answer and Counterclaim admitted that (1) Michael Millward was a debtor in a
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding filed on September 10, 2012, (2) the Millward bankruptcy was
pending during the First Action, (3) Millward was protected by the automatic stay provided by
11 U.S.C. §362, and (4) the Millward bankruptcy was dismissed on June 23, 2016. R. Vol. Ip.
53, ,r7.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The Respondents accept Wildlife Ridge's statement of Issues on Appeal, and add the
following additional issue:
1.

Are the Respondents entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal

pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 41 , and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Code§ 12-121 ?
1

Michael Millward ("Millward") and M & S Development, LLC ("M & S Development") were the makers of the
Trust Deed Note and Modification; M & S Development was the grantor of the Deed of Trust. R. Vol. I pp. 22-50.
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ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review.

Respondents agree with Wildlife Ridge's description of the Standard of Review on
Appeal. This Court is required to review a trial comi's grant of smmnary judgment de nova,
applying the same standard used by a tiial court when ruling upon a smnmary judgment motion
filed under I.R.C.P. Rule 56.
The tI-ial comi recognized and employed the required standard of review when ruling
upon the smmnary judgment motions filed by the Respondents. The tiial comi acknowledged
that the undisputed facts had been established upon a preponderance of the evidence, with all
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Wildlife Ridge, that all disputed facts were construed
liberally in favor of the non-moving party, Wildlife Ridge, and that all reasonable inferences that
could be drawn from the record were drawn in favor of Wildlife Ridge. R. Vol. I 138, 186.
B. The Dismissal of the First Action, With Prejudice, Required the Dismissal of
Wildlife Ridge's Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim for Fraud in this Action Under
the Doctrine of Res Judicata.

The trial comi dismissed the Respondent's affinnative defenses and fraud counterclaim
by employing of the doctiine of res judicata. The trial court detem1ined that the First Action
between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that the present case involves the
same paiiies as the First Action, and that all of the claims in the present case arise out of the
same transaction or series of trai1sactions at issue in the First Action. The gravamen of the First
Action was that the Respondents did not have an enforceable obligation secured by the Deed of
Trust.
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The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim
previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same
transaction which might have been asserted. The dismissal of the First Action served as a
dismissal with prejudice of every claim that was available to Wildlife Ridge to challenge the
existence and enforceability of the Trust Deed Note, the Modification, and the Deed of Trust at
issue in the present case.
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a comi
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella tenn for different but related concepts: claim
preclusion and issue preclusion."

Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Tab Decide Your Next

infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892,

128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether
claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Tic or Title Co. v. Stan ion, 144 Idaho 119, 123,
157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted).
A final judgment bars a party from re-litigating that same claim, regardless of whether
the subsequent litigation involves new or different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at
2171. This Court has explained claim preclusion as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (I) the original
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the original action.
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Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations
omitted, emphasis added).
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only the subsequent re-litigation of a claim
previously asserted, but also the subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same
causes of action which were actually made, or which might have been made. Elliot v. Darwin
Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action between the
same parties upon the same claim or demand, the fonner adjudication concludes parties and
privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as
to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic Valley
Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1993)(emphasis
added); see also Joyce v. Mwphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241 , 242-43
(1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars ' successive litigation of an issue of fact or law
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court detennination essential to the prior judgment,'
even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S at 892, 128 S. Ct.
at 2171 (internal citation omitted). When a comi finally detennines an issue in one case that is
essential to that judgment, a litigant is batTed from raising the issue again in another lawsuit.
Res judicata serves tlu·ee fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would fo llow if the same
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133
(Ct.App.1 983)).
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Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128
S. Ct. 216 1, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008).
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of
a p1ior litigation is a question of law upon which this Comt exercises free review.
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an
affinnative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841
P.2d 413, 420 (1992).
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616.
Wildlife Ridge should have asserted in the First Action every legal rule and/or equitable
principle or remedy available to establish that the Trust Deed Note and Modification were
unenforceable. Instead it sought only to quiet title to the property described in the Deed of Trust
on the basis that the obligations secured by that Deed of Trust had been satisfied.
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits Wildlife Ridge from asse1ting any new or
additional claims for relief in the present action because those claims for relief were available to
it at the time of the First Action. When the First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the
ability to relitigate any other legal rule or equitable principle designed to prevent the enforcement
of the Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trust.
1.
Millward and M & S Development Were Not Indispensable Parties to the
First Action and Their Absence as Parties Did Not Prevent Wildlife Ridge from Asserting
Alternative Claims for Relief in the First Action.

Wildlife Ridge admits in its b1ief to this Court that its affirmative defense of fraud was
never raised in the First Action.2 But Wildlife Ridge then argues that it was barred from
2

Appellant's Brief, p. 8.
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asserting that defense in the First Action because one of the makers of the Trust Deed Note,
Millward, was a debtor in bankruptcy during the pendency of the First Action and therefore
protected by the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. §362. The other maker of the Trust Deed
Note and grantor of the Deed of Trust, M & S Development, was not a party to the First Action,
either. Wildlife Ridge argues that due to the absence of Millward and M &S Development as
parties in the First Action, the defenses and counter claims raised in the present action could not
have been litigated by it in the First Action and therefore could not be precluded by the doctrine
of res judicata in the present case. Respondents dispute that argument.
All of the factual allegations supporting the affinnative defenses and fraud claim alleged
in the Answer and Counterclaim existed during the pendency of the First Action and there is no
valid reason why the same factual allegations and claims for legal and equitable relief could not
have been asserted against the Respondents in the First Action.
Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). Under that rule, a
party shall be joined if:
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
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(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incuning double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a).
Complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if the court in the First Action
had been asked to grant the same relief sought by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and
Counterclaim. Wildlife Ridge could have asserted in the First Action that the Trust Deed Note
and Modification were unenforceable because the statute of limitations had run on the
obligations secured by the Deed of Ttust.

Or, that the Modification was the product of

fraudulent conduct on the part of Respondents. Wildlife Ridge could have asked the trial court in
the First Action to enjoin Respondents from ever taking action to enforce the Trust Deed Note,
Modification, and Deed of Trust. Millward and M & S Development were not indispensable
parties. "A victim of wrongdoing is not generally required to sue all wrongdoers. Certainly not
in a tort case, where the rnle of joint and several liability reigns; ..." Babb v. Mid-Am. Auto Exch. ,
Inc., 2006 WL 2714273 at *2 (D. Km1. Sept 22, 2006).
If the Trnst Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trnst had been rendered completely

unenforceable in the First Action, it would not matter on which grounds Wildlife Ridge would
have rendered these instruments unenforceable, or the basis for such a judicial finding. That
outcome would not have adversely affected either Millward or M & S Development since the
debt they were personally responsible to pay would no longer be enforceable against them by the
Respondents.
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There was no risk that Millward or M & S Development would be exposed to double,
multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since Respondents would have been bound by the
First Action's ruling that the Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trust were
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of that decision was that the debt had been satisfied
or that the debt was unenforceable based on the statute of limitations or fraud arguments urged
by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and Counterclaim. See, Magic Valley Radiology, supra.
As such, Millward and M & S Development were not indispensable parties with respect
to Wildlife Ridge's claims in the First Action and Wildlife Ridge's unsuccessful first attempt to
have the Deed of Trust declared unenforceable precludes a second attempt via the new claims for
relief set out in its Answer and Counterclaim.
2.
Wildlife Ridge Could Have Asserted the Statute of Limitations and Other
Grounds for Relief in the First Action.

Wildlife Ridge, in part 3. of its Brief, argues that the relief it sought in the First Action
was baned by this Court's decision in Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952). In
Trusty this Court detennined that a "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title
against a mo1igagee, while the secured deb! remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations
has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage."
Wildlife's reliance on Trusty is over broad.

This Court's decision in Trusty only

concluded that the "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee,
while the secured debt remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the
right to foreclose the mo1igage."
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The rule stated in Trusty did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge from bringing all other available
claims for legal or equitable relief in the First Action. Even if the quiet title relief Wildlife Ridge
sought in the First Action was barred by Trusty, the Trusty decision did not prevent Wildlife
Ridge from claiming that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust were otherwise
unenforceable because of the running of the statute of limitations, laches and/or unclean hands
on the part of the Respondents, or the Respondents' fraud. Wildlife Ridge could have asked for
a pennanent injunction prohibiting Respondents from taking any action to enforce the
obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, or, as beneficiary, directing the Trustee to pursue nonjudicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust. Wildlife Ridge did not do any of that.
Wildlife Ridge argues that the five-year time frame for commencing an action to
foreclose the Deed of Trust had expired based on the Trust Deed Note's stated maturity date of
June 28, 2006.

Wildlife Ridge offers no acceptable explanation for why this statute of

limitations claim was not asse1ied in the First Action.
Nonetheless, Respondents dispute that the applicable statute of limitations has run. Idaho
Code§ 5-214A provides a five-year statute of limitations for the commencement of an action for
the foreclosure of a mmigage. That statute states:
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within
five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such
m01igage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness.
Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of limitations for the foreclosure of
deeds of trust. That statute states:
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The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property.
However, the applicable statute of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on
November 8, 2012, thereby extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of
Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, until November 8, 2017. R. Aug. p. 075.
Idaho Code§ 5-238, addresses the effect of paiiial payments. That statute provides:
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in
some wtiting, signed by the paiiy to be charged thereby; but any payment ofprincipal or
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the
debt. (emphasis added).
Payments of interest or principal serve to restaii the statute of limitations on all
installments on the note pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879,
881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2007).
There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Respondents received a
payment on the Trust Deed Note and Modification in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that
payment to the principal due on the obligation. R. Aug. p. 075. As such, this paiiial payment
made on the Trust Deed Note and Modification restaiied the five-year statute of limitations and
extended the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, including the right to
foreclose that Deed of Trust, until November 8, 2017.
The Complaint was filed within the five-year limit. R. Vol. I p. 12. Thus, under the
provisions of LC. § 5-238, the November 8, 2012 partial payment to the Respondents constituted
"a new promise in writing", extending the statute oflimitations found in I.C. § 5-214A and I.C. §
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45-1515 for an additional five years. The Respondent's Complaint to enforce the Trust Deed
Note and Modification and to foreclose the Deed of Trnst was timely filed. The Respondents
were not ban-ed by the statute of limitations from commencing the present action.
3.
The Administrative Dissolution of Monitor on November 9, 2012, Did Not
Prevent it From Being Sued in the First Action or From Filing the Present Action.

Wildlife Ridge attempts to distance itself from the doct1ine of res judicata by arguing that
since one of the Respondents, Monitor, had been administratively dissolved on November 9,
2012, it could not have been a real party in the First Action. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata
could not apply to prevent Wildlife Ridge from asserting the Answer and Counterclaim against
Monitor in the present action. See, Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
The dissolution of Monitor before the c01mnencement of the First Action on December 2,
2014, did not prevent Monitor from appearing in the First Action and defending itself against
Wildlife Ridge's claims. See, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 48-3a-703(2)(b )(iii).
48-3a-703. Winding up.
(1) A dissolved limited liability company shall wind up its activities and affairs and,
except as otherwise provided in Section 48-3a-704, the limited liability company
continues after dissolution only for the purpose of winding up.
(2) In winding up its activities and affairs, a limited liability company: (emphasis
added)

(a) shall discharge the limited liability company's debts, obligations, and other liabilities,
settle and close the limited liability company's activities and affairs, and marshal and
distribute the assets of the limited liability company; and
(b) may: (emphasis added)
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(i)deliver to the division for filing a statement of dissolution stating the name of the
limited liability company and that the limited liability company is dissolved;
(ii) preserve the limited liability company activities, affairs, and property as a going
concern for a reasonable time;
(iii) prosecute and defend actions and proceedings, whether civil, criminal, or
administrative; ( emphasis added);

(iv) transfer the limited liability company's property;
(v) settle disputes by mediation or arbitration;
(vi) deliver to the division for filing a statement of te1mination stating the name of the
limited liability company and that the limited liability company is te1minated; and
(vii) perfonn other acts necessary or appropriate to the winding up.
Monitor was authorized under Utah law to appear in and defend Wildlife's claims in the First
Action. And as part of its winding down, Monitor was authorized to prosecute the present action
to enforce its interest in the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust.
Further, Wildlife Ridge's argument in this regard does not address the other Respondent,
First Capital, or challenge First Capital's existence at the time the First Action was dismissed
with prejudice. Nor does Wildlife Ridge claim that First Capital is not entitled to the protections
afforded litigants under the doctrine of res judicata.
As concluded by the trial court, Monitor was a legitimate party in interest and a named
defendant in the First Action and entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of res judicata. R. Vol. I
p. 144.
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C. Respondents' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust Is Not Barred by
the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
Wildlife Ridge's Third Issue on Appeal argues that Respondents were barred from
judicially foreclosing the Deed of Trust in the present action because of the dismissal of the First
Action. Wildlife Ridge's argument suggests that Respondents had the legal obligation to pursue
judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the First Action as a compulsory claim, or suffer the
consequences of res judicata being applied against them in the present action.
As defendants in the First Action, Respondents were charged with defending against
Wildlife Ridge's claim that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust had been satisfied. All
Respondents had to prove in order to defeat Wildlife Ridge's claim in the First Action was to
show that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust had not been satisfied.
Wildlife Ridge has acknowledged that on September 10, 2012, Millward filed for relief
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay
co1mnenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited the Respondents from taking any action to
enforce the Trust Deed Note and Modification against Millward. Respondents were therefore
stayed from enforcing the Trust Deed Note and Modification, and from foreclosing the Deed of
Trust securing those obligations until Millward's bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016. 2
The dismissal of Millward' s bankruptcy proceeding occurred after the First Action was
dismissed.

2

Upon the closing of his bankruptcy case Millward's discharge under 1 I U.S.C 3727 became final and Respondents
were prohibited from pursuing him in the present action.
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The automatic stay created by Millward's bankruptcy filing also prohibited Respondents
from pursuing M & S Development because that limited liability company was wholly owned by
Millward and his wife, Stephanie, and therefore property of the Millward Bankruptcy Estate. R.
Vol. Ip. 157 (Schedule B - Personal Property).
11 U.S.C. § 362 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301 [a voluntary case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code,
including Chapter 7], 302, or 303 ohhis title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of

process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title; (emphasis added)

***
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against propeiiy of the estate.

***
11 U.S.C. § 362 prevented Respondents from asking, and the trial court from issuing its
process or summons against Millward and M & S Development. Respondents were also stayed
from pursuing any act against Millward's property, M & S Development such as pursuing a
judgment lien against it for any deficiency after the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust.
As a result, the trial court was prevented from obtaining jurisdiction over Millward and
M & S Development during the pendency of the First Action. Respondents, therefore, could not
pursue enforcement of the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust in the First Action.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 13(a) provides:

Compulsory Counterclaim .
(1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that, at the time
of its service, the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim:
(A) arises out of the transaction or occun-ence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim; and
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added).

Millward and M & S Development, as makers of the Trust Deed Note and Modification,
were indispensable parties in any action Respondents could prosecute in order to enforce the
Trust Deed Note and Modification, and also judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust securing those
obligations. Galvanizer's Co. v. State Highway Commission, 8 Wn.App. 804, 807, 509 P2d. 73
(Wash. App. 1973).
Under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), Millward and M & S Development needed to be brought into the
First Action before Respondents could be afforded complete relief.

Millward and M & S

Development had a right to independently challenge the enforcement of the Trust Deed Note,
Modification and Deed of Trust in the First Action had the Respondents attempted to enforce
their rights under those instruments.
Unlike Wildlife Ridge's right to assert any and all claims against the Respondents to
render unenforceable the Trust Deed Note and Modification and to prevent any future
foreclosure of the Deed of Trust by the Respondents, the Respondents were prohibited from
joining Millward and M & S Development in the First Action and litigating their claims under
the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust due to the applicable bankruptcy stay. A
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fortiori, Respondents did not actually litigate their claims under the Trust Deed Note,
Modification or Deed of Trust in the First Action, nor could they. Respondents are not prohibited
from pursuing their claims in the present action under this doctrine of res judicata.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondents have complied with I.A.R. 41 by asserting that they are entitled to an
attorney fee award in their statement of issues on appeal.
Idaho Code § 12- 120 (3) allows a prevailing party in a civil action to recover attorney
fees "on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction." Respondents contend that the underlying Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed
of Trust give rise to an award of fees under this section both because Respondents were seeking
recovery under a note or negotiable instrument (the Trust Deed Note) and because its loan to
Millward and M & S Development arose out of a conunercial transaction whereby the
Respondents provided financing to Millward and M & S Development to improve the real
property desc1ibed in the Deed of Trust and develop the Wildlife Ridge residential subdivision.
Further, Wildlife Ridge's prosecution of this appeal notwithstanding the clear
applicability of res judicata to the claims and defenses asserted in its Answer and Counterclaim,
leads to a reasonable conclusion that Wildlife Ridge's appeal has been brought and pursued
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Treasure Valley Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v.
Earth Resources Co., 115 Idaho 373,380, 766 P.2d 1254, 1261 (Ct.App. 1988)
For these reasons, this Court should award attorney fees in favor of the Respondents.
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of res judicata was applied correctly by the trial court. Wildlife Ridge was
obligated to assert in the First Action all of the claims and defenses it asserted in its Answer and
Counterclaim because all of those defenses and claims existed before and during the pendency of
the First Action. The dismissal of the First Action, with prejudice, constituted a decision on the
merits which precludes the re-litigation of those claims and all related claims in this case.
Respondents were not required to pursue judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the
First Action because Millward and M & S Development were indispensable parties to such an
action and they could not be joined as parties in the First Action by reason of Millward's pending
bankruptcy case and the applicable bankruptcy stay. Therefore, Respondents were not precluded
from pursuing its claims in the present action and recovering the foreclosure decree and
deficiency judgment entered by the trial court.
The decisions below should be affinned. Respondents should be awarded their costs
including their reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 17111 day of May, 2018.

. and First
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